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NEW LIFE FOR THE DOCTRINE OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL

CONDI-

TIONS?-Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal.

3d 252, 625 P.2d 779, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981).
In Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, I the California
Supreme Court held that the California legislature could not constitutionally refuse to pay for abortions for indigent women if it was willing to pay
for other procreation-related medical expenses. 2 The court rejected the
conclusion of the United States Supreme Court that a public welfare program could constitutionally fund childbirth but not abortion 3 and invalidated the abortion funding restrictions under the California Constitution. 4
In contrast to the United States Supreme Court's use of an equal protection analysis, 5 the California court in Myers applied the little known doctrine of unconstitutional conditions to the problem. 6 Using this doctrine to
invalidate abortion funding limitations had been suggested by several
commentators, among them Justice Brennan. 7 The Myers court followed
their lead, concluding that the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions was
a more appropriate method to use in deciding abortion funding cases than
the more traditional approach based on the equal protection clause. 8 This
Note traces the development of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions
1. 29 Cal. 3d 252, 625 P.2d 779, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981).
2. Id. at 256-57, 625 P.2d at 781,172 Cal. Rptr. at 868.

3. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319-20 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977).
The HarrisCourt upheld the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment, which virtually eliminated
federal funding for abortions. See Pub. L. No. 96-12, § 109, 93 Stat. 926 (1980 version). Maher

upheld a Connecticut statute that funded only "therapeutic," or medically necessary abortions.
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 466 n.2. Both cases, however, dealt with essentially the same constitutional issue. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 314-15.
4. The California court had the right to interpret its constitution to provide more protection than
does the United States Constitution. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980).
But there is arguably no difference in the wording of the two documents that suggests that the right to
abortion is stronger under the California Constitution than under the United States Constitution. See
infra note 74.

5. For a general discussion of the Supreme Court's application of equal protection analysis in
Maher v. Roe and Harrisv. McRae, see infra notes 132-39 and accompanying text. See also Appleton, Beyond the Limits ofReproductive Choice: The Contributionsof the Abortion FundingCases to
FundamentalRights Analysis and to the Welfare-RightsThesis, 81 COLuM. L. REv. 721 (1981).

6. For a definition of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, see infra note 9 and accompanying text.
7. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 334-37 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Another commentator, who
wrote before Myers was decided, suggested that using the unconstitutional conditions doctrine would
eliminate many of the doctrinal difficulties of the Harrisapproach and would allow courts to reach a
more equitable result. Note, Constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment, 3 WHrrriER L. Rev. 381,
404-05 (1981).
8. 29 Cal. 3d at 257, 625 P.2d at 781, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 868. Chief Justice Bird, concurring in
Myers, argued that the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions was inappropriate and that equal protection analysis should be applied. See infra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
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both in California and in the federal courts and compares the doctrine
with equal protection analysis in the context of the abortion funding
cases. The Note concludes that the Myers court should not have applied
the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions because the doctrine was not
applicable to the facts of the case and because equal protection analysis
provides a better analytical tool for deciding such cases.
1. BACKGROUND OF THE DOCTRINE OF
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions prevents the government
from conditioning the grant of a benefit upon the waiver of a constitutional right. 9 The history of the doctrine's development and decline, both
in the federal courts and in California, helps explain its meaning and significance.
A.

Development of the Doctrinein FederalCourts

1.

State Restrictionson Out-of-State Corporations

Federal courts first applied the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions
in a series of cases involving state attempts to deny certain benefits to outof-state corporations.' 0 The states contended that because they had the
constitutional right to ban out-of-state corporations from doing business
in the state, 1I they also had the right to place conditions upon the "privilege" of doing business there.1 2 After vacillating in several cases, 13 the
9. See L. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 510 (1978).
10. See, e.g.. Frost v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583 (1926); Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257
U.S. 529 (1922). For a general discussion of the history of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine,
see infra note 13 and the sources listed therein.
I1. See infra note 15.
12. See Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 48 (1897); Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co. 94 U.S.
535. 541 (1877). The states' most persuasive argument for allowing them to do this was that the
-greater" right, which they admittedly possessed, to exclude corporations necessarily encompassed
the "lesser" right to admit the corporations only upon certain terms. The Court apparently accepted
this argument in some cases. See Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S. 140, 145 (1924); Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 48 (1897). For a defense of the logic of the argument, see Hale, Unconstitutional
Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 COLUM. L. REv 321, 321-22 (1935); Merrill, Unconstitutional Conditions, 77 U. PA. L. REV 879, 889-92 (1929).
13. The Supreme Court indicated as early as 1856 that a state could not impose conditions that
are .repugnant to the Constitution or laws of the United States" on foreign corporations wishing to
do business in the state. Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404,407 (1856). The Court
held in Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U.S. 535 (1877), however, that a state government could
condition a license to do business in the state on a waiver of the constitutional right to remove lawsuits to federal court. Id. at 541. The Doyle decision was gradually given a narrower and narrower
interpretation, and was finally overruled by Chief Justice Taft in Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257

Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine

United States Supreme Court concluded that such restrictions were unconstitutional. 14 Although the Court recognized the absolute right of each
state to exclude out-of-state corporations, 15 it did not allow the states to
force foreign corporations to choose between doing business and exercising constitutionally guaranteed rights. 16 The Court concluded that a
state's threat to exclude out-of-state corporations could be so coercive
that the corporations would have little real choice but to "waive" their
rights. 17 This fictitious "choice," if legitimized by the Court, would have
enabled states to accomplish indirectly, through conditions placed on the
benefits they dispensed or controlled, what the Constitution prohibited
them from doing directly. 18
As the Supreme Court expanded the scope of the equal protection
clause 19 and the commerce clause, 20 and limited the states' absolute right

U.S. 529 (1922). For a complete discussion of this development, see G. HENDERSON, THE POSITION
OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS INAMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 132-47 (1918); Hale, supra note 12;
Merrill, supra note 12.
14. Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529 (1922).
15. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869); Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.)
519 (1839). States no longer have an absolute right to exclude out-of-state corporations. Western &
S. Life Ins. Co. v. Board of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 667-68 (1981).
16. Frost v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 593 (1926). Most commentators reached this conclusion as well. See Powell, The Right to Workfor the State, 16 COLUM. L. REv. 99, 110-11 (1916);
Comment, UnconstitutionalConditions:An Analysis, 50 GEo. L.J. 234, 236-37 (1961); Note, Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers: Abortion Funding Restrictions as an Unconstitutional Condition, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 978, 985 (1982).
The Court recently adopted the argument that the power to exclude does imply the power to exact
conditions in the context of Indian tribes' ability to control entry onto reservations. See Merrion v.
Jicarilla Apache Indian Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 144 (1982) (holding that an Indian tribe's power to
exclude entry onto its lands "necessarily includes the lesser power to place conditions on entry").
17. In 1926, the Court stated that "in reality, the [corporation] is given no choice, except a
choice between the rock and the whirlpool-an option to forego a privilege which may... constitute
an intolerable burden." Frost v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 593 (1926).
18. In Frost v. Railroad Comm'n, the Court adopted the language of Justice Day's dissent in
Security Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Prewitt, 202 U.S. 246, 267-69 (1906):
[If the unconstitutional conditions doctrine did not apply,] the state would be permitted to destroy a right created and protected by the federal Constitution under the guise of exercising a
privilege belonging to the state, and, as we have pointed out, the state might thus deprive every
foreign corporation of the right to do business within its borders, except upon the condition that
it strip itself of the protection given it by the federal Constitution.
Frost v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 596 (1926) (quoting Security Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Prewitt,
202 U.S. at 267-69 (1906) (Day, J., dissenting)). See also Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S.
529, 532 (1922); Merrill, supra note 12, at 888 (describing the "policy against accomplishing a
forbidden result by indirection").
19. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
20. For a general discussion of the scope of the commerce clause and its expansion during this
period, see P. BENSON. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE. 1937-1970 (1970); Stem,
The Commerce Clause Revisited-The Federalization of Intrastate Crime, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 271
(1973).
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to exclude out-of-state corporations, 21 the doctrine lost its usefulness in
this context. 22 In recent years, the Court has not applied the doctrine to

cases involving out-of-state corporations, even where the prior unconsti23
tutional conditions decisions are directly on point.
2.

Civil Rights Cases

Following World War II, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions
found new life with expanded judicial scrutiny of restrictions on free
speech and other civil rights. 24 Many of the early civil rights cases decided by the Court involved governmental denials of economic or political benefits to those who exercised various unpopular rights. These cases
dealt with conditions such as loyalty oath requirements, 25 restrictions on
the use of the mails by "subversive" organizations, 26 and restrictions on

21. Seesupra note 15.
22. A good example of a case decided under the commerce clause that previously would have
been decided under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond,
336 U.S. 525 (1949) (holding that state could not restrict milk producer's expansion into interstate
commerce).
23. In Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. Board of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648 (1981), for example,
the Court upheld a retaliatory tax imposed only on out-of-state corporations against equal protection
attacks. In its analysis, the Court cited a number of the unconstitutional conditions cases, including
Frost v. Railroad Comm'n. After analyzing these cases, Justice Brennan, writing for the majority,
determined that:
[Wihatever the extent of a State's authority to exclude foreign corporations from doing business
within its boundaries, that authority does not justify imposition of more onerous taxes or other
burdens on foreign corporations than those imposed on domestic corporations, unless the discrimination between foreign and domestic corporations bears a rational relation to a legitimate
state purpose.
Id. at 667-68.
24. The genesis of this development was in a 1950 case, American Communication Ass'n v.
Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). There, the Court examined a 1947 amendment to the National Labor
Relations Act allowing access to the investigatory and enforcement arms of the National Labor Relations Board only to those union leaders who signed loyalty oaths. Although the Court upheld the
provision, Justice Frankfurter dissented in part, arguing that the oath requirement was an unconstitutional condition. Id. at 419-20 (Frankfurter, J., concurring and dissenting). For a general discussion
of the doctrine's applicability to civil rights cases, see O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare
Benefits with StringsAttached, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 443 (1966); Van Alstyne, The Demise of the RightsPrivilegesDistinction in ConstitutionalLaw, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968); Willcox, Invasions of
the First Amendment through Conditioned Public Spending, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 12 (1955); Comment,
supra note 16; Comment, Another Look at Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 144
(1968); Note, JudicialAcquiescence in the Forfeitureof ConstitutionalRights Through the Expansion of ConditionedPrivilege Doctrine, 28 IND. L.J. 520 (1953).
25. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). The Court there struck down a California statute
granting property tax exemptions only to those veterans who signed loyalty oaths.
26. Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1956). The Hannegan Court invalidated Post Office regulations denying favorable rates to certain publications that did not meet certain ambiguous
moral standards.

Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine
religious expression. 27 The government's position in these cases was an
extension of the argument that the greater right to refuse to provide a certain benefit at all encompassed the "lesser" right to provide it selectively,
28
subject to any condition the government wished to impose.
Deeply embedded in constitutional law during this period was the sharp
distinction between "rights," which were protected by the Constitution,
29
and "privileges," which were exclusively controlled by legislatures.
The legislatures or administrative agencies that sought to impose conditions on constitutional rights relied on the right-privilege distinction to
argue that they were merely discouraging the exercise of rights by restricting the privileges they granted. 30 Because the benefits that legislatures manipulated in these cases were clearly privileges, the distinction
seemed to require that courts defer to the legislature even if constitutional
31
rights were indirectly abridged.
With the public's increasing reliance on public welfare benefits after
World War II, the Court became increasingly interested in limiting the
ability of legislatures and administrative agencies to manipulate the benefits they controlled so as to shape the recipients' behavior. 32 One way to
27. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). The Court in Sherbert invalidated restrictions on
unemployment compensation denying benefits to applicants who refused, for religious reasons, to
work on days other than Sunday, but allowing benefits to applicants who refused Sunday work.
28. For a discussion of this argument, see supranote 12 and accompanying text.
29. The right-privilege distinction provided that while constitutional rights such as first or fourth
amendment rights could never be granted or denied conditionally, privileges provided by the government could be conditioned or limited as the government wished. Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S. 140,
145 (1924); see generally, E. GELLoRN. INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENTAL RESTRAINTS
105-51 (1956). The most famous early exposition of this principle is Justice Holmes' statement:
"The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be
a policeman." McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E.2d 517 (1892). The
reasoning of McAuliffe was rejected in Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967), where the
Court, in striking down rule requiring police officers to waive right against self-incrimination, stated
"policemen ... are not relegated to a watered-down version of constitutional rights". The concept
that public welfare benefits are "privileges" that can be restricted or eliminated as the government
sees fit has been severely eroded. See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964); Van
Alstyne, supra note 24, at 1464-66.
30. See, e.g., Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43,47-48 (1897).
31. In Davis, for example, the Court upheld an ordinance prohibiting public speaking in a municipal park on the theory that since the local government could deny access to the park completely, it
could grant access subject to any conditions it wished to apply, even if those conditions included
denying first amendment rights. Although Davis was never explicitly overruled, the Court has since
refused to accept its reasoning, see Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 514-16 (1939); Jamison v. Texas,
318 U.S. 413,415-16 (1943), and has indicated that the Davis rule is no longer good law, see Saia v.
New York, 334 U.S. 558, 561 n.2 (1948); but see Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 451
(1954) (Court refused to review state standards for admission to medical practice because such admission is a "privilege granted by the state").
32. Note, supra note 16, at 985; Note, UnconstitutionalConditions, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1595,
1596 (1960). The Court still enforced the right-privilege distinction in some cases. See, e.g., Cohen
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limit this abuse was to insist that the government not restrict the exercise
of constitutional rights in return for distributing benefits. 33 Because it prohibited this type of activity, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine became a well-recognized and frequently used exception to the right-privilege distinction. 34 By applying the exception broadly, courts could retain
the right-privilege distinction while at the same time invalidating conditions put on "privileges" when those conditions seriously impaired the
recipients' abilities to exercise fundamental constitutional rights. 35 In
most cases, the doctrine successfully prevented the harsh results caused
36
by treating a benefit as a fully revocable "privilege."
3.

The Rise of EqualProtectionAnalysis
By the early 1960's, equal protection analysis 37 had generally replaced

v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961), overruled, Sperack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967) (Court approved
condition on privilege of practicing law requiring waiver of right against self-incrimination).
33. For a forceful argument favoring use of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions to check
abuse of legislative and administrative power, see Willcox, supra note 24, at 45-48.
34. Van Alstyne, supra note 24, at 1445-48; see also cases cited supra notes 25-27. The Court
also occasionally used equal protection analysis without so identifying it. See. e.g., Keyishan v.
Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967) (Court held rule prohibiting communist party members from working as teachers "overbroad," but indicated that benefit of public employment could
not be conditioned on waiver of constitutional rights).
35. Van Alstyne, supra note 24, at 1447. The doctrine has some limitations as an exception to
the right-privilege distinction. First, it applies only to conditions that involve recognized, and apparently fundamental, constitutional rights. Second, it is usually not applied to conditions that have only
an indirect effect on a constitutional right. See Van Alstyne, supra note 24, at 1449. Committee to
Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 625 P.2d 779, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981), is
an exception to this second limitation. In Myers, the doctrine was applied even though the effect of
the abortion funding law was indirect.
36. The doctrine did not always prevail over the right-privilege distinction, however. For an
example of an onerous condition on a public benefit to which the doctrine did not apply because there
were no constitutional rights involved, see Hamilton v. Board of Regents, 293 U.S. 245 (1934) (refusing to apply doctrine to conditions on college admission because higher education was not a fundamental constitutional right). But see Smythe v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. 777 (W.D. Mich 1973) (holding that state college cannot condition attendance on waiver of right not to have dormitory room
searched).
37. For a general discussion of the equal protection framework, see Tussman & tenBroek, The
Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949); Comment, Developments in the Law:
Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1087-1132 (1969). For an early version of the Court's
formulation of and justification for equal protection analysis, see United States v. Carolene Prods.
Corp., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 & n.4 (1938). For a general discussion of the "two-tiered analysis," see
Gunther. Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court, A Model for Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972). For more critical approaches to two-tiered analysis, see
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 340-42 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (expressing dissatisfaction
with the rigidity of the two-tiered formula, calling it a "relentlessly formalistic catechism"); Trimble
v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777-86 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (outlining theoretical difficulties
with Court's approach to equal protection and two-tiered analysis); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,

684
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the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions in the federal courts as a means
to ensure that the exercise of constitutional rights was not compromised in
exchange for governmental benefits. 38 Under equal protection analysis, a
court applies strict scrutiny to legislation that discriminates against a
"suspect class" 39 or burdens a "fundamental right. "40 Legislation subject to strict scrutiny is upheld only if it is justified by some "compelling,
state interest.' '41 Legislation that does not implicate a suspect class or a
fundamental right, on the other hand, is constitutional so long as it bears a
"rational relationship to a legitimate state interest." 42
The reasons for the Court's shift from the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions to equal protection analysis in cases involving restrictions on
public welfare benefits was never elucidated by the Court, nor can they be
gleaned solely from the cases. The two doctrines function completely
separately as independent methods of constitutional analysis, and the decision to apply one rather than the other seems to depend less on the facts
of any particular case than on the predilections of the author of the opinion. 43 While the reasons for a shift away from the unconstitutional condi-'
tions doctrine may be unclear, the fact of the shift is undeniable.
211-13 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that two-tiered analysis is inappropriate because
"[tlhere is only one Equal Protection Clause").
38. The equal protection clause was first used in civil rights cases as a tool to fight racial discrimination. See, e.g., Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Buchanan v. Warley, 245
U.S. 60 (1917); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
But the Court soon began to apply equal protection analysis to a wide variety of cases. By the
1960's, it had largely replaced the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions as a means to protect recipients of public welfare benefits from limitations on those benefits designed to deny or limit recipients'
ability to exercise constitutional rights. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), represents the last
time the Court purported to apply the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to a public welfare program. Although Sherbert invalidated limitations on unemployment benefits because they were "unconstitutional conditions," the Court's opinion was couched in equal protection language. See id. at
404-06. Some lower federal courts continue to apply the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. See,
e.g., Roberts v. Cameron-Brown Co., 410 F. Supp. 988, 998 (1975) (court held Federal National
Mortgage Association clause requiring waiver of right to hearing before foreclosure an unconstitutional condition).
39. The first explicit application of the so-called "strict scrutiny" test to a "suspect classification" came in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). Strict scrutiny has since been
applied by the Court to invalidate virtually all explicit racial classifications. See, e.g., Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (invalidating statute prohibiting interracial marriages under strict
scrutiny analysis).
40. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395
U.S. 621, 627 (1969).
41. E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11
(1967).
42. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973); see J. NOWAK. R.
ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG. HANDBOOK ON CONrsrtrONAL LAW 619 (1978).
43. This is illustrated by the numerous cases both before and after Sherbert v. Verner in which
the Court could have applied the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions but did not. In Wiemann v.
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952), for example, the Court rejected the State of Oklahoma's argument
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Commentators have suggested two possible reasons for this unexplained but discernable movement away from unconstitutional conditions
analysis. The first was the decline of the distinction between rights and
privileges. 44 As that distinction gradually became less important in constitutional jurisprudence, 45 the need for a means to avoid its strictures naturally lessened. 46 Thus, one of the primary advantages of the doctrine
was eliminated. The second was the growing realization that equal protection analysis was more universally applicable and more flexible than
that it could impose conditions such as loyalty oath requirements on the "benefit" of public employment. The Court did not even mention the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. Id. at 191-92.
Rather, the Court flatly stated that "constitutional protection does extend to the public servant whose
exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory." Id. at 192. See also Flemming
v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960) (Court upheld restrictions on social security benefits denying
them to deported aliens); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (Court invalidated
suspension of high school students for wearing black armbands to protest Vietnam War).
In a recent case, Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. Board of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648 (1981), the
Court was faced with a situation factually similar to the older unconstitutional conditions cases involving out-of-state corporations. After analyzing these older cases extensively, the Court concluded
that in essence they established a rationality requirement: the State could not "discriminate" between
domestic and foreign corporations unless that discrimination bore a "rational relation to a legitimate
state purpose." Id. at 667-68. See supra note 23.
In a line of cases involving conditions on public employment requiring a waiver of constitutional
rights, the Court has continued to use the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, perhaps in an effort
to avoid the conclusion that public employment is anything more than a mere privilege. Thomas v.
Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507,
514 (1980); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 355-57 (1976); Keyishan v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S.
589 (1967); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967). Even in these public employment cases,
however, the Court's reliance on the doctrine seems to be waning. In the most recent of these cases,
Thomas, Justice Brennan characterized the unconstitutional condition involved there as only one type
of possible infringement on a fundamental right, indicating that the doctrine is a variant of the more
common equal protection analysis. Id. at 717-18.
Justice Douglas also advocated use of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. Jones v. Board
of Educ., 397 U.S. 31, 34 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the doctrine should apply to
dismissals from state-run universities for exercise of constitutional rights); Thorpe v. Housing Auth.,
386 U.S. 670, 679 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring) (advocating application of doctrine to denial of
public housing benefits for exercise of constitutional rights).
In two cases since Sherbert, the Court has explicitly refused to extend the doctrine. Abood v.
Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 226-27 (1977) (doctrine inapplicable when no constitutional
rights are involved); The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9-10 n. 10 (1972) (doctrine
inapplicable to private contractual clauses denying right of removal to federal court).
44. See Van Alstyne, supra note 24, at 1454-57. Professor Van Alstyne states that "use of the
equal protection clause, although it does not qualify the right-privilege distinction, does succeed in
rendering it inconsequential." Id. at 1457.
45. Van Alstyne, supra note 24, at 1444-46. One recent commentator has taken issue with Professor Van Alstyne about his claim that the right-privilege distinction is dead. See Smolla, The Reemergence of the Right-PrivilegeDistinctionin ConstitutionalLaw: The Price of ProtestingToo Much,
35 STAN L. REv 69 (1982).
46. Cummings v. Godin, 119 R.I. 916, 377 A.2d 1071, 1075 (1977) ("[Tlhe distinction between privileges and rights has been eliminated, and unconstitutional conditions cannot be placed on
public employment.").
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the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. 47 Unlike the system of multitiered scrutiny courts created to make equal protection analysis useful in
many different types of situations,48 no consistent scheme for evaluating
the validity of conditions which require the waiver of constitutional rights
has ever emerged. 4 9 Certainly not all conditions requiring a waiver of
constitutional rights are invalid. 50 Yet the doctrine never incorporated an
identifiable method for distinguishing those conditions that were permissible from those that were not.
B.

UnconstitutionalConditions in California

In contrast to the federal courts, some state courts have applied the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions vigorously in the last forty
years. 5 1 The majority of the cases have involved the first amendment
47. This realization is documented by the vast increase in the Court's use of equal protection
analysis in the last 30 years.
48. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text. Acceptance of multitiered scrutiny has not,
however, been universal. See supranote 37.
49. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963); Buckley v. Coyle Pub. School Sys., 476
F.2d 92 (10th Cir. 1973) (court applied strict scrutiny to overturn rule that conditioned employment
on waiver of right to become pregnant); Jarmel v. Putnam, 179 Colo. 215,499 P.2d 603 (1972) (court
applied strict scrutiny to residency requirement that was characterized as an unconstitutional condition). Other courts have applied the more lenient "rational relationship" test. See Brunton v. United
States, 518 F. Supp. 223 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (applying rational relationship test to uphold rule conditioning public employment on party affiliation); United States v. Thorn, 317 F. Supp. 389 (E.D. La.
1970) (court rejected argument that requiring service with Goodwill in lieu of draft was unconstitutional condition because alternate service requirement met rational relationship test); Campbell v.
District Court, 195 Colo. 304, 577 P.2d 1096 (1978) (state can impose conditions on benefits given to
mental incompetents if the conditions meet rational relationship test); People v. Huntley, 43 N.Y.2d
175, 371 N.E.2d 794, 401 N.Y.S.2d 31 (1977) (conditions requiring waiver of constitutional rights
can be put on "privilege" of parole if they meet rational relationship test). At least one court has
indicated that no conditions burdening constitutional rights are valid. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v.
Commissioner of Ins., 358 Mass. 272, 263 N.E.2d 698 (1970) (state statute requiring all insurance
companies to lower rates by 15% or give up privilege of doing business in Massachusetts declared a
condition on a constitutional right and therefore automatically invalid). No court has suggested a
means for determining which test should be applied to a particular condition. The closest that any
court has come to a uniform test is the test developed in California. See infra note 80. But even in
California, this test has not been applied to all conditions burdening fundamental rights. See, e.g.,
Carmel-By-The-Sea v. Young, 2 Cal. 3d 259, 466 P.2d 225, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970) (invalidating
condition on public employment for "overbreadth"); Fort v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 61 Cal. 2d 331,
392 P.2d 385, 38 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1964) (applying overbreadth analysis).
50. See, e.g., Brunton v. United States, 518 F. Supp. 223 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (upholding conditions relating to party affiliation on public employment); Campbell v. District Court, 195 Colo. 304,
577 P.2d 1096 (1978) (upholding conditions placed on benefits granted to mentally handicapped);
Arizona v. Montgomery, 115 Ariz. 583, 566 P.2d 1329 (1977) (state can impose conditions that
force parolees to waive constitutional rights).
5 1. California is the best example. See infra notes 54-62 and accompanying text. Justice Brennan implicitly recognized in his majority opinion in Sherbert v. Verner that state courts have applied
the doctrine to civil rights cases more often than have federal courts. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374
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rights of either government workers or welfare recipients, 52 but the doc53
trine has also been applied in other situations.
The doctrine has found especially strong support in California. The
California Supreme Court first held that a condition on a public benefit
54
was unconstitutional in Danskin v. San Diego Unified School District.
In Danskin, the court invalidated a regulation requiring organizations
wishing to use school buildings for public meetings to sign statements
that they did not advocate the forceful overthrow of the United States
government. 55 Because the school district could not constitutionally demand that the plaintiffs promise not to advocate overthrow of the government, 56 the court concluded that it also could not condition the benefit of
57
using school buildings on the giving of such a promise.
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions has often served as a substitute for equal protection analysis in California. 58 California courts have
U.S. 398, 404-05 n.6 (1963) (citing eight state court cases and only one federal case that had held
that liberties of religion could not be curtailed by placing conditions on a privilege).
52. See, e.g., Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d 885 (1946)
(school district cannot condition public use of school building on taking of loyalty oath); Lawson v.
Housing Auth., 270 Wis. 269, 70 N.W.2d 605 (1955) (court declared condition on public housing
benefits requiring loyalty oath unconstitutional); Housing Auth. v. Cordova, 130 Cal. App. 2d Supp.
883. 279 P.2d 215 (1955) (state could not condition receipt of public housing benefits on taking of
loyalty oath), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 969 (1956).
53. See, e.g., Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 66 Cal. 2d 260, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623
(1967) (county cannot condition receipt of housing benefits on waiver of right against unreasonable
searches); People v. Connell, 2 Ill. 2d 332, 118 N.E.2d 262 (1954) (state cannot condition ight to
seek divorce upon waiver of constitutional ights); Harryman v. Hayles, 257 N.W.2d 631 (Iowa
1977) (nonclaim statute requiring notice to state within sixty days or suit against state would be
disallowed held an unconstitutional condition); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Commissioner of Ins.,
358 Mass. 272, 263 N.E.2d 698 (1970) (state cannot condition grant of license to issue insurance
policies upon waiver of right to be free from confiscatory rates); People v. Huntley, 43 N.Y.2d 175,
371 N.E.2d 794, 401 N.Y.S.2d (1977) (state cannot condition granting of parole upon waiver of
constitutional rights in certain circumstances); Hartford Accident & Indem. Ins. Co. v. Ingram, 290
N.C. 457, 226 S.E.2d 498 (1976) (requiring all general liability insurers also to write health care
insurance held an unconstitutional condition); Commonwealth v. Quarles, 229 Pa. Super. 363, 324
A.2d 452 (1974) (requiring waiver of right to refuse breathalyzer test in order to obtain driver's
license held an unconstitutional condition).
54. 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d 885 (1946).
55. 171P.2dat888.
56. Justice Traynor, writing for the majority, assumed that such statements could not directly be
prohibited absent a "clear and present danger." Id. at 889 (citing Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47, 52 (1919)).
57. 171 P.2d at 891-92. Justice Traynor, in reaching this conclusion, cited several old United
States Supreme Court cases, including Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 110 (1943); Hague
v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939); Frost v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 594 (1926); Terral v.
Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529 (1922); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1 (1910).
58. California also has a line of cases developing its equal protection clause in a way that is
substantially identical to that found in federal cases. The California Constitution has an equal protection clause which is identical to the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 7. See Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 15-20, 485 P.2d 529, 538-41, 95 Cal.
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used the doctrine to invalidate conditions requiring the waiver of free
speech, political association, and other constitutional rights placed on the
"privilege" of being employed by the government 59 or of receiving welfare benefits. 60 In doing so, the California court has developed a two-step
analysis. The first step is to determine whether there is a condition burdening a fundamental constitutional right. The second step is to determine
whether that condition is a valid one. 6 1 Since reaching the second step
means in effect automatic invalidation of the statute, 62 the first step in this
Rptr. 329, 338-41 (1971) (interpreting privileges and immunities/equal protection clause that was
predecessor to current California constitutional provision as equivalent to federal equal protection
clause); Los Angeles County v. Southern Cal. Tel. Co., 32 Cal. 2d 378, 196 P.2d 773, 781 (1948)
(stating test under state constitution is substantially the same as under federal equal protection
clause). But see Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel., 24 Cal. 3d 458,469, 595 P.2d 592,
598, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14, 20-21 (1979) (refusing to follow decisions of federal courts in interpreting
state action requirement of state equal protection clause, stating that "we do not consider ourselves
bound by . . .decisions [interpreting the federal Constitution] in interpreting the reach of the safeguards of our state equal protection clause").
The California court has used equal protection analysis in lieu of the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions on several occasions. In Gay Law Students Ass'n, for example, a public utility allegedly
refused to hire gay persons. Id. at 463, 595 P.2d at 595, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 17. The court could have
characterized the utility's action as conditioning the privilege of public employment upon a waiver of
the constitutional right to privacy including protection of sexual autonomy. See Morrison v. Board of
Educ., 1 Cal. 3d 214, 233 n.38, 461 P.2d 375, 390 n.38, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175, 190 n.38 (1969);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). Instead, without even mentioning the doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions, the court concluded that the utility could not arbitrarily discriminate
against homosexuals or any other class. Gay Law Students Ass'n., 24 Cal. 3d at 470, 595 P.2d at
597, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
Another case in which the California court could have applied the doctrine is Raffaelli v. Committeeof Bar Examiners, 7 Cal. 3d 288, 496 P.2d 1264, 101 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1972). In that case, the
court decided that requiring United States citizenship as a prerequisite to entrance to the California
Bar was an unconstitutional classification because it had an insufficient rational connection with a
legitimate state purpose. Id. at 301, 496 P.2d at 1273, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 905. The court could also
have concluded that the requirement unconstitutionally conditioned the "privilege" of practicing law
on the requirement that all applicants be or become citizens. See also Examining Bd. of Engineers,
Architects and Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976) (applying strict scrutiny to rule that
aliens could not be certified as engineers).
59. Rosenfeld v. Malcolm, 65 Cal. 2d 559, 600, 421 P.2d 697, 698, 55 Cal. Rptr. 505, 506
(1967); Bagley v. Washington Township Hosp. Dist., 65 Cal. 2d 499, 421 P.2d 409, 55 Cal. Rptr.
401 (1966); Fort v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 61 Cal. 2d 331, 392 P.2d 385, 38 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1964);
Cannel-By-The-Sea v. Young, 2 Cal. 3d 259,466 P.2d 225, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970).
60. Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 66 Cal. 2d 260, 262, 425 P.2d 223, 225, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623,
625 (1967); Housing Auth. v. Cordova, 130 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 883, 279 P.2d 215 (1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 969 (1956); King v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 25 Cal. App. 3d
199, 101 Cal. Rptr. 660 (1972).
61. This is accomplished by the so-called "Bagley" test. see infra note 80.
62. California appellate courts have rarely, if ever, held that a statute could pass the strictures of
the test employed in the second step of this analysis. For a full discussion of this test, see infra note
80. As Justice Tobriner has conceded, this test, in its harshness, resembles the strict scrutiny test
employed by the federal courts. See infra note 81. One commentator has argued that the test has the
potential for being more flexible than strict scrutiny, but did not mention any cases in which the test
had been applied to validate a statute. See Note, Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers:
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process is the crucial one. Accordingly, this Note analyzes only the first
step: whether or not a condition burdening a constitutional right exists.
II.

THE MYERS COURT'S REASONING

California's 1978, 1979, and 1980 Budget Acts 63 had provisions that
refused to extend the state's "Medi-Cal" 64 coverage to abortions except
under limited circumstances. 65 Before these provisions took effect, 66 a
The Constitutionality of Conditions on Public Benefits in California, 33 HAsT. L.J. 1475, 1497-1500
(1982).
63. 1978 Budget Act. 1978 Cal. Stat. 823-25 (ch. 359, § 2, item 248); 1979 Budget Act, 1979
Cal. Stat. 644-46 (ch. 259, § 2, item 261.5); 1980 Budget Act, 1980 Cal. Stat. 1146-48 (ch. 510, §
2, item 287.5).
64. The California Medi-Cal program is authorized in CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 14000-194
(West 1980 & Supp. 1983). Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396d (1976 &
Supp. V 1981), authorizes federal funding of between 50% and 83% of the cost of a state-run medical
aid program for the indigent if the program meets federal standards. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(b) (1976 &
Supp. V 1981). For an overview of the state-federal medicaid system, see Butler, The Medicaid
Program: Current Statutory Requirements and Judicial Interpretations, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 7
(1974).
65. The 1979 and 1980 Budget Acts contained the following restrictions:
[N ]one of the funds appropriated . . . [for Medi-Cal] shall be used to pay for abortions, except
under any of the following circumstances:
(a) Where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to full term.
(b) Where the pregnancy is ectopic.
(c) Where the pregnancy results from an act punishable under Section 261 of the Penal Code
and such act has been reported, within 60 days, to a law enforcement agency or a public health
agency which has immediately reported it to a law enforcement agency, and the abortion occurs
during the first trimester.
(d) Where the pregnancy results from an act punishable under Section 261.5 of the Penal
Code, and the female is under 18 years of age, and the abortion is performed no later than the
first trimester, provided the female's parent or guardian or, if none, an adult of the female's
choice is notified at least five days prior to the abortion by the physician who performs the
abortion. Regulations governing the notice requirement shall be promulgated by the State Director of Health Services.
(e) Where the pregnancy results from an act punishable under Section 285 of the Penal Code,
and such act has been reported to a law enforcement agency or a public health agency which has
immediately reported it to a law enforcement agency and the abortion occurs no later than during
the second trimester.
(f) Where it is determined by prenatal studies limited to amniocentesis, fetal blood sampling,
fetal antiography, ultrasound, X-ray, or maternal blood examination that the mother is likely to
give birth to a child with a major or severe genetic or congenital abnormality due to the presence
of chromosomal abnormalities, neural tube defects, biochemical diseases, hemoglobinopathies,
sex-linked diseases, and infectious processes.
(g) Where severe and long-lasting physical health damage to the mother would result if the
pregnancy were carried to term, when so certified under penalty of perjury by two physicians,
one of whom, where practicable, is a specialist in the affected medical discipline, and documentation thereof is provided with the claim for payment.
1980 Cal. Stat. 1146-47; 1979 Cal. Stat. 644-45. The exceptions contained in the 1978 Act were
substantially the same, except that (f) was limited to amniocentesis and (g) was applicable only if the
"Isevere and long-lasting physical health damage" was caused by one or more of ten specifically
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group of welfare, health care, and women's rights organizations and other
interested parties 67 filed suit against several state officials 68 alleging that
69
the provisions were unconstitutional.
In Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers,70 the California
Supreme Court held that the provisions violated the California Constitu72
tion. 71 The Myers plurality opinion, written by the late Justice Tobriner,
applied the unconstitutional conditions analysis as set out in Danskin and
its progeny. 73 Justice Tobriner first noted that the court was not bound by
federal constitutional law and could, under the California Constitution,
reach a result different from that reached by the United States Supreme
Court. 74 He stated that the basic premise of his analysis was that "all
enumerated conditions or diseases. 1978 Cal. Stat. 823-24. Since it had been changed before the
Myers court made its determination, the 1978 provision was not separately considered by the court in
Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 259 n.1, 625 P.2d 779, 782
n. 1, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866, 869 n. 1(1981).
The California legislature included the same restrictions in its 1981 Budget Act as well. The California Court of Appeal declared these restrictions invalid, rejecting the argument that court-ordered
payments for abortions constituted an appropriation in violation of the separation of powers clause.
Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Cory, 132 Cal. App. 2d 852, 183 Cal. Rptr. 475
(1982).
66. In the legal challenge to these abortion funding restrictions in the Myers case, see infra notes
67-69 and accompanying text, the trial court granted a temporary restraining order extending through
pendency of appeal, but later held both the 1978 and 1979 Budget Act provisions constitutional. For a
full procedural history of the case before the California high court's decision, see Myers, 29 Cal. 3d
at 258-60, 625 P.2d at 782-83, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 869-70; Note, Committee to Defend Reproductive
Rights v. Myers: Medi-Cal FundingofAbortions, 9 GOLDEN GATE L. REv. 361,377-79 (1979).
67. Three physicians, one patient, and one taxpayer were also named as plaintiffs. Note, supra
note 16, at 979 n.8.
68. These included Beverlee A. Myers, Director of the State Department of Health Services;
Kenneth Cory, State Comptroller; and Jesse M. Unruh, State Treasurer. Note, supra note 16, at 979
n.7.
69. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 256, 625 P.2d at 780, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
70. 29 Cal. 3d 252, 625 P.2d 779, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981).
71. Id. at 285, 625 P.2d at 799, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 886. Justices Mosk and Newman concurred in
the plurality opinion. Chief Justice Bird wrote a concurring opinion. Justice Richardson filed a dissent in which Justice Clark concurred. There were only six justices on the court at the time the decision was published, as Justice Wiley Manuel had recently died.
72. Justice Mathew 0. Tobriner died on April 7, 1982. See Bird, JusticeMathew 0. Tobrinerthe heart of a lion, the soul of a dove, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 870 (1982); Balabanian, Justice was more
than his title (Mathew Tobriner, Cal. Supreme Ct.), 70 CALIF. L. REv. 878 (1982); Tribe, Remembering Mathew Tobriner, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 876 (1982).
73. 29 Cal. 3d at 262-70, 625 P.2d at 784-89, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 871-76. See supra notes 54-62
and accompanying text.
74. 29 Cal. 3d at 260-62, 625 P.2d at 783, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 870-71. The court cited People v.
Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528,549-50, 531 P.2d 1099, 1113, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975) ("[t]he California Constitution is, and always has been, a document of independent force ....").Although the
court did determine that the words of the California Constitution supported a broader reading of the
right to an abortion than the United States Supreme Court gave the United States Constitution in
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), and Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980), see infra note 75,
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women in this state-rich and poor alike-possess a fundamental consti75
tutional right to choose whether or not to bear a child."
Justice Tobriner then addressed the state's major contention: that the

legislature is free to decline to fund the exercise of a constitutional right
without violating the constitution. 76 He found that this was essentially the
same argument the court had rejected in Danskin,77 and determined that
the abortion restrictions were an unconstitutional condition on a public
benefit just as were the restrictions on the use of public buildings in Danskin. 78 The abortion funding limitations, he concluded, excluded "potential recipients solely on the basis of their exercise of constitutional rights"
and thus fell squarely under the reasoning of Danskin and the other Cali79
fornia unconstitutional conditions cases.
The court applied a three-part test developed in earlier California decisions to determine the validity of these conditions contained in the funding restrictions. 80 In its application to the facts of Myers, Justice Tobriner
the best evaluation of Myers is that the California court simply disagreed with the results of the
federal cases.
75. 29 Cal. 3d at 262, 625 P.2d at 784, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 871. The California court first declared
that abortion was a fundamental constitutional right in People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d
194. 199, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354. 359 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970). Justice Tobriner did not
discuss the United States Supreme Court's statement in Roe v. Wade that states do have at least a
minimal interest in preventing abortions even in the first trimester of pregnancy. See Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 162-63 (1973) (state has some interest in protecting both the health of the mother and
the "potentiality of human life" existing in the fetus throughout pregnancy). This language lends
support to the argument that although the state's interest is not strong enough to support criminal
statutes outlawing nontherapeutic abortions, it may be strong enough to support a refusal to subsidize
such abortions. The argument is especially strong if the refusal is characterized as mere deference on
the part of the legislature to economic forces it does not control.
Justice Tobriner also argued that the right to choose abortion was especially strong in California
because the California Constitution explicitly guarantees the right to privacy. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at
262-63, 625 P.2d at 784, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 871. Art. 1, § 1, added in 1974, provides that: "All
people are by nature free and independent and have certain rights. Among these are enjoying and
defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining
safety, happiness, and privacy." Justice Tobriner argued that the right to abortion under the federal
Constitution was weaker because the right to privacy is not explicitly mentioned in that document.
Myers. 29 Cal. 3d at 263, 625 P.2d at 784, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 871. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (Court first found an implicit right to privacy in reproductive rights context). However. Justice Richardson, in his dissent in Myers, argued that -'[tihere is nothing whatever
in the history of the initiative [adding the right of privacy to the list of constitutional rights in California] to suggest such a bizarre result." 29 Cal. 3d at 304, 625 P.2d at 811, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 898
(Richardson, J.. dissenting). He went on to state that the privacy right was ostensibly designed only
to prevent government and business from massing personal information about citizens. Id.
76. 29 Cal. 3d at 263, 625 P.2d at 784-85, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 871-72.
77. Id. See Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d 885, 891
(1946); supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
78. 29 Cal. 3d at 264, 625 P.2d at 785-86, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 872-73.
79. Id. at 265, 625 P.2d at 786, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 873.
80. This test was first formulated in Bagley v. Washington Township Hosp. Dist., 65 Cal. 2d

692

Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine
stated, the three-part test "closely parallel[ed]" strict scrutiny. 81 Because
the state's interest was on all counts insufficient to meet the standards set
out by the test, Justice Tobriner concluded that the restrictions were in82
valid.
Concurring, Chief Justice Bird declined to follow the unconstitutional
conditions analysis.8 3 She utilized instead the traditional equal protection
approach: that governmental infringement of a fundamental constitutional
right triggers strict scrutiny. 84 In using equal protection analysis to determine the validity of these provisions, she followed the method the United
States Supreme Court had used in Maherv. Roe8 5 and Harrisv. McRae,8 6
although her conclusion was different.8 7 She rejected the United States
499, 421 P.2d 409, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1967). That case held that an unconstitutional condition is
valid only when the following three issues are decided in favor of the state:
1. the conditions which are imposed relate to the purposes of the legislation which provide the
benefit, 421 P.2d at 414, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 406;
2. the utility of the conditions imposed clearly outweighs the resulting impairment of constitutional
rights, 421 P.2d at 415, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 415; and
3. there are no less offensive alternatives available to achieve the state's objective, id.
Justice Tobriner called this approach "special scrutiny." Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 257, 625 P.2d at
781, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 868. The relative merits of this test as opposed to the more traditional "twotiered" test associated with equal protection analysis are beyond the scope of this Note. For a complete analysis of this topic, see Note, supra note 62.
Justice Tobriner's view of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions was not shared by all members of the California Supreme Court. Chief Justice Bird argued in a long footnote in her concurring
opinion in Myers that the so-called "Bagley" test was an early formulation of the strict scrutiny
standard and as such had been superseded by more recent California cases. She also disagreed with
the suggestion in Bagley and in Justice Tobriner's plurality opinion in Myers that restrictions on a
fundamental right can be justified by anything less than a compelling state interest. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d
at 289 n.2, 625 P.2d at 801 n.2, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 888 n.2 (Bird, C.J., concurring).
81. 29 Cal. 3d at 276 n.22, 625 P.2d at 793 n.22, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 880 n.22. The California
court seems to be alone in developing a separate test for determining the validity of unconstitutional
conditions. Other courts have applied either the "strict scrutiny" test or the "rational relationship"
test but have not enumerated any identifiable method for determining which is applicable to various
cases. See supra note 49. Subsequent California cases have referred to Myers as a case applying a
strict scrutiny test. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 30 Cal. 3d 70, 79 n.9,
634 P.2d 917, 922 n.9, 177 Cal. Rptr. 566,571 n.9 (1981).
82. 29 Cal. 3d at 270-85, 625 P.2d at 789-98, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 876-85.
83. Id. at 286,625 P.2d at 799, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 886 (Bird, C.J., concurring).
84. Id. at 287, 625 P.2d at 800, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 887 (Bird, C.J., concurring). She assumed,
based on Roe v. Wade, that the right to abortion was fundamental. This is a fairly well-accepted
assumption. Ely, Foreivard:On Discovering FundamentalValues, 92 HARV. L. REv. 5, 38 (1978)
("If therefore, the Roe decision is to be even coherently defended, it has to be along the general line
the Court itself pursued, that a woman's right to choose abortion is simply so important, so fundamental, that we cannot permit it to be legislatively inhibited."). Ely pointed out, however, that the
Court has never really enumerated the reasons why procreative choice is a fundamental right. Id. at
80.
85. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
86. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
87. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 294-95, 625 P.2d at 805, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 892 (Bird, C.J., concurring). One other court has followed roughly the same analysis. See Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J.
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Supreme Court's holding that refusing to fund abortions did not infringe
upon a woman's right to have one. 88 Chief Justice Bird instead maintained that the legislature cannot ever directly or indirectly burden the
exercise of a fundamental right without a compelling reason for doing
SO. 8 9

Two justices joining in the dissent emphasized the distinction between
infringing upon a right and refusing to subsidize the exercise of a right. 90
This distinction, they argued, allows the government to choose not to
subsidize activities it cannot outlaw altogether without violating either the
equal protection clause or the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.91
III.

ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S REASONING

The most common modem analytical approach to the abortion funding
problem, equal protection analysis, is unsatisfactory in many respects. 92
The Myers opinion implicitly suggests that unconstitutional conditions
analysis can be used to reach a more just result while avoiding many of
the doctrinal problems that influenced the United States Supreme Court
when it denied poor women a constitutional right to publicly funded abortions. 93 The result reached by the plurality opinion in Myers did avoid
many of these problems. It implicitly recognized the need to limit the
government's disproportionate power to influence the behavior of poor

287, 450 A.2d 925 (1982) (interpreting New Jersey's equal protection clause to render state Hyde
Amendment unconstitutional).
88. For a discussion of this argument, see infra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
89. Chief Justice Bird stated that: "In California, there is no precedent for permitting government to burden the exercise of vital constitutional rights without establishing a compelling need. The
fact that the state has not banned the exercise of the right entirely is irrelevant to the basic issue."
Myers. 29 Cal. 3d at 288, 625 P.2d at 800, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 887 (Bird, C.J., concurring). In support
of the proposition that indirect restrictions of constitutional rights are invalid, she cited only one other
Caliifornia case involving the equal protection clause. Id. at 288, 625 P.2d at 801, 172 Cal. Rptr. at
888. That case, Salas v. Cortez, 24 Cal. 3d 22, 593 P.2d 226, 154 Cal. Rptr. 529 (1979), involved the
right to counsel and may for that reason be distinguishable because of the government's monopoly of
the courts.
90. 29 Cal. 3d at 297-98, 625 P.2d at 807, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 894 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
91. Id. Justice Richardson stated that: "The Legislature's decision to pay for the expenses of
childbirth . . . no more 'forces' a woman to give up abortion than funding the purchase of false teeth
forces one to give up toothbrushes." Id.
92. For a general discussion of the equal protection approach and its weaknesses when applied to
the abortion funding problem, see infra
notes 132-43.
93. The result in Myers required funding for abortions, but avoided a general requirement that all
exercises of constitutional rights by poor people be subsidized. See infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
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persons, 94 while stopping short of requiring government subsidies for the
95
exercise of constitutional rights by the poor.
Analyzing the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions as it was used in
Myers, however, indicates that applying it to the abortion funding problem is not satisfactory despite the surface appeal the doctrine may have in
this context. The remainder of this Note shows why the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions did not work well in Myers. It concludes that
equal protection analysis, although also flawed in its application to abortion funding cases, is nonetheless a superior alternative to that chosen by
the plurality in Myers.
A.

The Doctrineof UnconstitutionalConditionsand the Abortion
FundingProblem

The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions does not function effectively in abortion funding cases for two reasons. First, it leads courts to
sidestep the main issue of these cases. Second, it cannot logically be applied to a situation in which the benefit is related to the condition that
restricts it.
1. The DoctrineAllows Courts to Bypass the MainIssue of the Abortion
FundingProblem
The most important issue presented by cases dealing with abortion
funding restrictions is how far the government may go to discourage a
woman's constitutionally protected right to have an abortion. 96 There is
no simple answer to this question. Clearly the government may not take
affirmative steps, through its police power, to proscribe constitutionally
protected activites absent some compelling state interest. 97 Such steps are
no more valid when they entail conditioning a benefit than when they
94. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 268, 625 P.2d at 788, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 875: "The California courts...
have acknowledged both the practical importance of many governmental benefits to individual recipients and the corresponding likelihood that a discriminatory benefit program will effectively nullify
constitutional rights."
95. The court stated that "plaintiffs do not contend that 'the state would be required to fund
abortions for poor women if the state had not chosen to fund medical services for poor women who
choose to bear a child." Id. at 256-57, 625 P.2d at 780-81, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 867-68. It concluded
that, as a general proposition, "the state need not fund abortions, childbirth, appendectomies, or any
other medical procedure." Id. at 285 n.3 1, 625 P.2d at 799 n.31, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 886 n.3 1.
96. The sheer volume of criticism this aspect of Harrisv. McRae has received shows the importance of this point. See, e.g., Goldstein, A Critique of the Abortion FundingDecisions: On Private
Rights in the Public Sector, 8 HAsT. CONsT. L.Q. 313, 316-17 (1981); see also infra note 136.
97. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1971); People v. Belous, 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d
195, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 915 (1970).
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involve a direct criminal sanction. 98 But it is equally clear that the government can refuse altogether to subsidize the exercise of a constitutionally protected activity if it wishes. 99
The California legislature's activity in Myers lay somewhere in between these two extremes. It can be characterized as a neutral decision to
stop spending public funds to subsidize a practice that is politically unpopular, although protected by the Constitution. But though the restrictions do not on their face limit the ability of California women to obtain
abortions, the legislature must have been aware that the restrictions would
have a significant effect on poor women's access to that procedure.OO
When combined with the fact that the legislature was willing to defray
childbirth and birth control expenses for poor women, its refusal to pay
for abortions calls into question whether the legislature exercised its admittedly broad discretionary power over public welfare funds' 0' in a way
that impermissibly interfered with the right to abortion.
If the right involved were a first amendment right, the restrictions
would clearly create a "chilling effect" on the exercise of the right and
would therefore be invalid. 102 But courts have heretofore been unwilling
to extend first-amendment-type protection to abortion or to any other right
outside the free speech and religion area. 103 The question whether governments should be allowed to structure public welfare benefit programs
so as to influence constitutionally protected choices such as abortion is a
close one with competing considerations on both sides.

98. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. Although the methods used in the old unconstitutional conditions cases may be discredited in federal courts today, the constitutional principles enunciated in those cases are for the most part still good law. See Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. Board of
Equalization. 451 U.S. 648 (1981) (citing with approval many old out-of-state corporations cases).
99. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471 (1970). Justice Tobriner in Myers also recognized this. See supra note 95.
100. For a discussion of the effect abortion funding restrictions have on the ability of poor
women to get abortions, see infra note 134. This argument is analogous to evaluating the "chilling
effect" of a statute that indirectly impairs free speech rights. See infra note 103.
101. See supra note 99.
102. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18
(1981) (holding public welfare restrictions having indirect effect on free exercise of religion invalid);
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (Court invalidated state common-law defamation
rules that had a chilling effect on free speech).
103. The United States Supreme Court has not decided whether an economic or welfare provision can be invalid because of its "chilling effect" on the exercise of a right. However, the Court
has, in other contexts, made plain that the type of exacting scrutiny given the effects of provisions
impinging on free speech rights cannot be similarly used to evaluate public welfare legislation. See
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (refusing to invalidate public welfare measure for
"'overreaching"). One state court has declared that abortion funding restrictions are invalid under this
reasoning. See Moe v. Secretary of Admin. & Fin., 387 Mass. 795, 417 N.E.2d 387, 400-02 (1981)
(state funding of procreation-related expenses must be neutral).
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The Myers court did not, however, address this central question. 104 Instead, once the court found that the abortion restrictions "conditioned"
public health care benefits, the doctrine, as the court applied it, invalidated the restrictions almost as if they were any other clearly discriminatory exercise of the state's police power.10 5 Although the court did discuss some of the competing interests, it indicated that only a compelling
state interest, or something resembling one, would be sufficient to justify
the restrictions. 106 Since there is clearly no compelling state interest to
support abortion funding restrictions, 107 most of this discussion is surplusage.
The real determination of the case was made in the preliminary step of
deciding whether or not to apply the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
Once it was deemed applicable, the government faced an almost impossible standard of proof to justify its action. 10 8 Instead of forcing the Myers
court to face the complex and difficult issue the case presented, the doctrine allowed the court to avoid it. If the Myers court had applied equal
protection analysis as did the United States Supreme Court in Maher v.
Roe' 09 and Harrisv. McRae,110 it would have been forced to deal with
this central question. For then the court would have had to define what

104. Justice Tobriner alluded to this question when he applied the three-part "Bagley" test to
determine the validity of the condition he found. See supra note 80. But if his statement that applying
the "Bagley" test "closely parallels" strict scrutiny analysis, 29 Cal. 3d at 276 n.22, 625 P.2d at
793 n.22, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 880 n.22, is correct, then that application will virtually always result in
invalidation. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("To challenge [statutes] ... by the 'compelling state interest' standard is to condemn them all. So far as I am
aware, no state law has ever satisfied this seemingly insurmountable standard, and I doubt one ever
will, for it demands nothing less than perfection."); Gunther, supra note 37, at 8 (strict scrutiny is
"'strict' in theory and fatal in fact"). But see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)
(only Supreme Court case upholding governmental action against strict scrutiny attack).
105. See supra note 104.
106. See supra note 104. The "Bagley" test can be somewhat less protective of individual rights
than strict scrutiny, in that it allows more balancing of the competing interests. Note, Committee to
Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers: The Constitutionality of Conditions on PublicBenefits in California, 33 HAsT. L. REv. 1475, 1500 (1982). But see Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 289 n.2, 625 P.2d at 802
n.2, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 889 n.2 (Bird, C.J., concurring) (rejecting argument that "Bagley" test is less
restrictive than strict scrutiny and allows balancing); Hernandez v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 30
Cal 2d. 70, 634 P.2d 917, 922 n.9, 177 Cal. Rptr. 566, 571 n.9 (1981) (in later opinion, Justice
Tobriner refers to Myers as a case applying strict scrutiny). But even assuming that the "Bagley" test
does allow the government's interest to be balanced against the individual's interest, applying it bypasses the real question, which is whether poor women have any legitimate interest at all in having
the government pay for abortions. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
107. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 297 & n.ll, 625 P.2d at 806 & n.ll, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 893 & n.Il
(Bird, C.J., concurring).
108. See supra note 106.
109. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
110. 448 U.S. 297(1980).
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constitutes a "burden" on a "fundamental right," issues the Myers court
did not really confront.
In contrast, the Supreme Court did confront these issues and concluded
that restricting Medicaid funding for abortions did not create a government-imposed "obstacle" to a woman seeking to exercise her constitutional right to have an abortion."' Because the Court applied equal protection analysis, its first step was to analyze the strength of the competing
rights and interests involved in order to determine how strong the state's
interest needed to be in order to uphold the restrictions. This forced the
Court to determine the extent of a state's power to selectively fund public
welfare programs in ways that reduce funding for constitutionally protected activities. Although many have criticized the Court for its conclusion, 112 it at least took a discernible position on the extent to which the
government can shape its public welfare programs in this way. 113 The
California court's use of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions did
not produce such a position in Myers. This silence reduces the usefulness
and persuasive value of the case.
2.

The Doctrine Is Workable Only When Applied to a Condition
Unrelatedto the Benefit Upon Which It Is Imposed

The second reason the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions should
not be applied to abortion funding cases is that the doctrine only works
when the condition is unrelated to the benefit on which it is imposed.
Traditionally, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine has been used to
prohibit the government from creating a coercive "choice" between receiving some important government benefit and exercising a constitutional right. "1 4 The courts in most of the unconstitutional conditions cases
I11. Id.

at 315 ("The Hyde Amendment . . . places no government obstacle in the path of a

woman who chooses to terminate her pregnancy, but rather, by means of unequal subsidization of
abortion and other medical services, encourages alternative activities deemed in the public interest."); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 474:
An indigent woman who desires an abortion suffers no disadvantage as a consequence of Connecticut's decision to fund childbirth; she continues as before to be dependent on private sources
for the service she desires. The State may have made childbirth a more attractive alternative,
thereby influencing the woman's decision, but it has imposed no restriction on access to abortions that was not already there. The indigency that may make it difficult-and in some cases,
perhaps, impossible-for some women to have abortions is neither created nor in any way affected by the Connecticut regulation.
See also Charles v. Carey, 627 F.2d 772, 776 (7th Cir. 1980) (abortion funding restriction "merely
implemented a State's preference for childbirth over abortion without adding any 'restriction on abortion that was not already there' ").
112.
113.
114.
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See infra note 136.
See infra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
See supra note 57 and cases cited therein.
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used the doctrine to invalidate attempts by the government to punish those
who exercised constitutional rights by denying them access to unrelated
5 The governrient chose the benefits to be conditioned more for
benefits. 11
their ease of manipulation than for their connection to the rights forfeited. 116 In these cases, the doctrine insured that the government could
not discriminate against those who wished to exercise certain constitutional rights any more than it could against racial minorities, aliens, or
other "suspect classifications." "17
The logic behind the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions breaks
down when the benefit conditioned is simply government subsidization of
the constitutional right the condition seeks to restrict. In this type of case,
the legislature does not pick out some benefit that is easy to manipulate
but otherwise unexceptional and deny it to a group the legislature wishes
to coerce into waiving constitutional rights. Rather, the lawmakers determine, based on substantive reasons independent of their ability to manipulate a benefit, that they do not wish to subsidize the activity at which the
benefit is aimed even though it happens to be constitutionally protected.
This distinction is subtle, but important. In the latter case, the legitimate
desire to restrict a public welfare benefit is at least arguably the motivating force. In the cases where the benefit is unrelated to the condition,
however, the benefit is not cut back out of any concern related to the
scope of that particular benefit, but solely out of a desire to use the legislature's power over it to restrict the exercise of an unrelated constitutional
right. Although the result may be the same, one is arguably a much less
objectionable legislative motive.)18
The difficulties that are encountered when the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is applied to situations in which the benefit and the condition relate to the same act are illustrated by Myers. 119 In Myers, the
plaintiffs were not asking to receive some benefit unrelated to the right
they wished to assert. Rather, they were asking that the government pay
115. See supranote 57 and cases cited therein.
116. This can be seen by the very fact that the benefits have no particular relationship to the
rights they are used to restrict. See, e.g., Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536,
171 P.2d 885 (1946) (benefit was free use of school buildings, right was right to advocate communism); Parrish v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 66 Cal. 2d 260, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1967)
(benefit was subsidized housing, right was freedom against unreasonable searches and seizures).
117. In fact, the doctrine can be characterized as creating another suspect classification: those
who wish to exercise a constitutional right.
118. For a general discussion of the constitutionality of legislative motives, see Ely, Legislative
andAdministrativeMotive in ConstitutionalLaw, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970).
119. The Myers court purported to deal with the argument that there is "a distinction between a
measure which denies other governmental benefits to women who choose to have an abortion and one
which simply denies funding for the abortion itself." 29 Cal. 3d at 268, 625 P.2d at 788, 172 Cal.
Rptr. at 875. But the court dealt with the wrong distinction. It failed to recognize the problem with
having the condition and the benefit relate to the same activity.
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for the assertion of the right itself. The Myers court realized that it could
not properly find an unconstitutional condition if the "benefit" to be conditioned was defined as subsidized abortions. For there would then be no
benefit. All women were denied Medi-Cal-funded nontherapeutic abortions: rich women, poor women, women who desired abortions, and
those who did not. 120 Indigent California women were not forced to make
a choice between receiving benefits and exercising constitutional rights as
were the plaintiffs in the earlier unconstitutional conditions cases. 121 The
legislature made that choice for them as it did for all California women.
The only identifiable "condition" or "limitation" the legislature placed
on the benefit of free nontherapeutic Medi-Cal abortions was to repeal the
benefit altogether.
Since a benefit that does not exist cannot be "conditioned," the Myers
decision could not be defended if the benefit were defined as subsidized
abortions. Although the indigent women who chose to bear their children
actually received more benefits than those who chose abortion, identical
benefits were freely available to all poor California women. The difference between the two groups is not that the government discriminated
against one in favor of the other, but that one group chose to avail itself of
the limited benefits the government did provide while the other group did
not. 122 If subsidized abortions were defined as the "benefit," it was a
benefit denied to all and not just to some.
The Myers plurality opinion took a more sophisticated approach. Justice Tobriner described the conditioned benefit as procreation-related
health care benefits in general rather than merely subsidized abortions. 123
The main objection to the restrictions was that when the California legislature eliminated abortion funding, it did not eliminate subsidies for other
procreation-related health care expenses such as childbirth and birth control.

24

The benefit, if defined in this way, was limited but not eliminated

by the abortion funding restrictions.
120.

See supra note 65.

121.

See supra note 114 and accompanying text.

122. This is not to say that the abortion restrictions in the Budget Act would not put a special
burden on women wishing to exercise their right to an abortion. Nevertheless, the burden is not
caused by direct governmental action, but by the economic system. See Gary-Northwest Ind.
Women's Servs. v. Bowen, 496 F. Supp. 894, 901 (N.D. Ind. 1980) ("The obstacle which the indigent women faced [in attempting to obtain an abortion] was not the Hyde Amendment, but the
women's indigency."), affdmem., 451 U.S. 934 (1981).
123. See Myers. 29 Cal. 3d at 270 n.19, 625 P.2d at 789 n.19, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 876 n.19. His
argument was that the Budget Act created a condition by not allowing indigent women who desired
abortions to receive the procreation-related health care of their choice as it did other indigent women.
See id. at 268-69, 625 P.2d at 788, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 875-76.
124. See generally CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 14053, 14132, 14191 (West 1980 & Supp.
1983): Note, supra note 66, at 393.
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Characterizing the benefit in this way leads to two problems. First, the
budget restrictions still place no "condition'? on procreation-related benefits in general. Benefits are "conditioned" when they are denied to some
while the very same benefits are granted to others. 125 In this case, the
range of available procreation-related health care benefits did not change
depending on whether a woman wanted to exercise her right to an abortion. The same benefits were available to all poor California women at
any time. 126 Therefore, they were not "conditioned." From an objective
point of view, the health care benefits Medi-Cal provided to women who
desired abortions were no less adequate than those it provided to indigent
women who wished to bear children. 127 Although some women received
fewer benefits than others, the ones who received less were at all times
128
eligible for exactly the same benefits as the ones who received more.
The second problem with defining the "benefit" as procreation-related
health care subsidies in general is that applying the doctrine of unconditional conditions in this way unduly restricts the legislature's ability to
control the benefits it dispenses through public welfare programs. If the
doctrine were consistently .applied as it was defined in Myers, it would
deny the legislature the right to narrow the scope of its public welfare
programs in ways that are likely to prevent some from exercising constitutional rights. The Myers court held in effect that the legislature could
not, consistent with the California Constitution, cut off funds that would
otherwise be spent for subsidizing the exercise of a constitutional right if
it chose to continue funding other "related" activities. 129 If this means
125. For example, in Danskin, those refusing to sign a loyalty oath were refused access to the
exact same benefits granted to those who did sign. 28 Cal. 2d 536, 545-56, 171 P.2d 885, 893
(1946). In Myers, however, this is not true. Thus, Justice Tobriner's statement that the plaintiffs were
denied abortion benefits "solely because such persons [sought] to exercise their~constitutional right of
procreative choice in a manner which the state does not favor" is simply wrong. 29 Cal. 3d at
256-57, 625 P.2d at 781, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
126. The Budget Act provisions were on their face completely equal in application. See supra
note 65.
127. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
128. This is not to say that the legislature's decision was desirable or even permissible or that it
had no effect on the number of women who obtained abortions. See infra note 138. But whatever it
did do, it did not create a "condition" burdening the exercise of a constitutional right.
129. The Myers court held that if the government did not fund other related activities, it would
have no constitutional obligation to pay for abortions. See supra note 95. Making this the touchstone
of a determination that an unconstitutional condition exists creates other problems. For example, how
is it possible to know when funds "would otherwise be spent" for abortions? The Myers court determined this by looking at the general purpose provision of the Medi-Cal statute. 29 Cal. 3d at 271-72,
625 P.2d at 790, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 877. The California legislature could amend section 14000 (the
purpose provision of Medi-Cal) to state that the purpose of the legislative scheme is to provide strictly
limited health care benefits to selected persons and only to the extent that the legislature determined
that public policy favored those specific benefits. Then abortion funding restrictions identical to the
Budget Act provisions invalidated in Myers would arguably be valid under the court's analysis. This
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that the California legislature has lost the ability ever to spend less on
public welfare benefits when such cutbacks might restrict poor people's
exercise of constitutional rights, then its impact on public welfare
schemes would be much more severe than the Myers court intended. 130
Not only would this rule seriously restrict the legislature's right to spend
its public welfare dollars as it wishes, but it would create the irrational
result that the legislature could cut off funds for constitutionally protected
activities as long as it also cut off funds for all other "related" pursuits.
Besides creating uncertainty about what were "related" activities, this
result would allow the legislature to bypass the requirements of the doctrine simply by eliminating subsidies for all "related" activities as well.
This would serve only to harm an even larger number of poor people. 131
B.

Equal ProtectionAnalysis in Abortion Funding Cases

The clarity of the Supreme Court's analysis in Maher v. Roe and Harris v. McRae provides a sharp contrast to that of the California court in
Myers. The Court's position was based on the theory that under the federal Constitution, economic restrictions on the exercise of fundamental
rights do not create government-imposed impairments of those rights. 132
If the Constitution protects only against active governmental encroachments of fundamental rights, 133 it follows that the government may refuse
simple legislative legerdemain would be sufficient. Justice Tobriner stated that such a characterization would not save the abortion restrictions, however, because characterizing them in this way
would be constitutionally impermissible. 29 Cal. 3d at 276 n.19, 625 P.2d at 789 n.19, 172 Cal.
Rptr. at 876 n. 19. But his statement that it is impossible to provide a particular benefit (here free
medical care during childbirth) while not providing an alternative (abortion) which many might prefer
and which is a constitutionally protected right is conclusory and begs the question.
130. This result contradicts the well-known doctrine that states may attack a social problem by
'select[ing] one phase of one field and apply[ing] a remedy there, neglecting the others." Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 495 (1974).
See also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970) ("the Equal Protection Clause does
not require that a State must choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the
problem at all"). This doctrine has been accepted by the California court. Hale v. Morgan, 22 Cal.
3d 388, 395, 584 P.2d 512,516-17, 149 Cal. Rptr. 375, 379-80 (1978).
131. Justice Tobriner apparently was willing to concede that a state permissibly could decline to
pay for any procreation-related health care expenses. See supra note 95.
132. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977).
133. The proposition that the Constitution protects only against direct governmental encroachments hinges on the premise that constitutional guarantees are not subjective; i.e., they protect individuals from government activity limiting certain specified rights but do not guarantee to individuals
the unfettered opportunity to exercise those rights. Such an assumption was made by Justice White in
his concurring opinion in Harrisv. McRae: "The constitutional right recognized in Roe v. Wade was
the right to choose to undergo an abortion without coercive interference by the government. " Harris
v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 327 (1980) (White, J., concurring). One commentator has stated that Harris v. McRae creates a distinction between "positive" rights and "negative" rights. Appleton, supra
note 5, at 734. Positive rights, such as voting, are subjective because they are shown to be violated by
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to subsidize activities that it cannot prohibit. This is true even if the structure of our economic system will, as a result of the government's inaction, preclude the poor from exercising their rights. 134 It remains true
even when the government was motivated in part by the desire to discour135
age constitutionally protected activities.
This conclusion has been disquieting to critics of the Court's conclusions in Maher and Harris. Many courts and commentators have criticized the Supreme Court for finding, based on equal protection analysis,
that governments can constitutionally pay for childbirth but not abor-

tion. 136 The determination that abortion funding restrictions create no
showing only that a person has not received them and not that the government has taken steps to
affirmatively deny them. These positive rights require government subsidy, whereas negative rights
protect only against objective government infringements. Id. at 731-37.
134. There are many constitutionally protected activities that the government would never wish
to subsidize or encourage. For example, the Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the right of an
individual to advocate and, in certain cases, to practice racial discrimination. See Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176 (1976) ("[Plarents have a First Amendment right to send their children
to educational institutions that promote the belief that racial segregation is desirable, and.., children
have an equal right to attend such institutions."); Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 171-72
(1972) (private clubs have a constitutional right to exclude members on the basis of race); see also id.
at 179-80 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (Bill of Rights permits racially segregated clubs). Yet it is established that governments may, and often must, take an activist stand toward discouraging racial discrimination. See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (state is not allowed passively to "permit" duplication of its primary election by a private segregated organization); Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1 (1948) (state must refuse to enforce private racially restrictive covenants); 42 U.S.C. §
1981 (1976) (prohibiting racial discrimination in the enforcement of private contracts).
135. The United States Supreme Court has upheld at least one decision to withhold benefits even
though it was clearly motivated by constitutionally impermissible purposes. Palmer v. Thompson,
403 U.S. 217 (1971) (upholding closure of public swimming pools to avoid racial desegregation); see
generally Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of UnconstitutionalLegislative
Motive, 1971 Sup. Cr. REv. 95 (1971) (analyzing whether an improper legislative motive should in
itself be grounds for constitutional infirmity); Ely, supra note 118 (general discussion of the role of
legislative motive in constitutional jurisprudence). Clearly, the government need not guarantee that
all will have the opportunity to fully exercise all of their constitutional rights. Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297, 318 (1980). But the line between "active" discouragement and "failure to subsidize" or
"indirect action" becomes less clear when selective funding for indigents, whose activities may
largely depend on government subsidy, is involved. Chief Justice Bird, concurring in Myers, stated
with some justification that "it is a distinction without a difference to assert that because the governmental action is indirect rather than direct, the infringements which result are of less significance
constitutionally." 29 Cal. 3d at 290 n.3, 625 P.2d at 802 n.3, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 889 n.3 (Bird, C.J.,
concurring).
136. Four state courts along with the California court have refused to follow Harrisv. McRae
and have invalidated abortion funding restrictions. Doe v. Maher, No. 19-68-74 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1981); Moe v. Secretary of Admin. & Fin., 387 Mass. 795,417 N.E.2d 387 (1981); Right to Choose
v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 450 A.2d 925 (1982); Fischer v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 66 Pa.
Comnw. 70, 444 A.2d 744 (1982). But see City of New York v. Wyman, 30 N.Y.2d 537, 281
N.E.2d 180, 30 N.Y.S.2d 537 (1972) (upholding abortion funding restrictions against equal protection attack).
Maher and Harrishave been almost universally criticized in the scholarly literature as well. See,
e.g.. L. TRIBE. AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 933 n.77 (1978); Bennett, Abortion and Judicial
Review: Of Burden and Benefits, Hard Cases and Some Bad Law, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 978, 1009-17
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"government-imposed obstacle" to poor women seeking abortions 137 has
been characterized as both inaccurate and unfair. These critics point to the
well-documented fact that restrictions on abortion funding make it impossible for many women to procure abortions. 138 The Court has recognized
in other contexts that for many people who depend upon government benefits, a refusal to subsidize certain constitutionally protected activities is
little different from outlawing their exercise. 139 The critics have argued
with some force that Maher and Harrisopen the door for increased legislative control over the exercise of constitutional rights by the poor and
(1981); Goldstein, supra note 96, at 318-24; Perry, Why the Supreme Court Was Plainly Wrong in the
Hyde Amendment Case:A Brief Comment on Harris v. McRae, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1113, 1197 (1980);
Simson, Abortion, Poverty and the Equal Protection of the Laws, 13 GA L. REV. 505, 505-14
(1979); Special Project, Survey ofAbortion Law, 1980 ARIZ. ST L.J. 67, 172-78 (1980); Note, Harris
v. McRae-The Hyde Amendment Stands While Rights of Poor Women Fall, 69 KY. L.J. 358,
379-91 (1981); Note, Indigent Women-What Right to Abortion?, 23 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 709,
727-41 (1978); Note, Harris v. McRae, 54 TEMP. L.Q. 109, 131-144 (1981); Note, supra note 7, at
398-402 (1981). But see Appleton, supra note 5; Fahy, The Abortion Funding Cases: A Response to
ProfessorPerry, 67 GEO. L.J. 1205, 1205-08 (1979); Hardy, Privacy andPublic Funding: Maher v.
Roe as the Interaction of Roe v. Wade and Dandridge v. Williams, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 903, 910-18
(1978).
137. See supra note 132.
138. The number of publicly funded abortions dropped from 295,000 in fiscal year 1977 to
194,000 in fiscal year 1978 as a result of abortion funding restrictions permitted by the Supreme
Court's holding in Maher allowing states to implement Medicaid funding restrictions. Henshaw, Forrest, Sullivan & Tietze, Abortion Services in the United States, 1979 and 1980, 14 FAM. PLAN. PERSP
5, 13 (1982). One study, based on statistics from two states, estimated that the funding restrictions
caused between 18% and 23% of those women who would have obtained a Medicaid abortion before
passage of the budget restrictions to forego one. Trussel, Menken, Lindheim & Vaughn, The Impact
of Restricting MedicaidFinancingforAbortion, 12 FAM PLAN. PERSP. 120, 127-28 (1980).
139. In Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), the Court required states to dispense with
court fees for indigents seeking divorces, thereby indicating that the right of access to the courts
includes a requirement that the government subsidize the exercise of that right for indigents. Id. at
383. See also Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (prisoners have constitutional right of access to
adequate law libraries); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (finding that a right to appointed
counsel for indigent criminal defendants seeking to appeal convictions is mandated by the equal protection clause); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (constitutional right of indigent criminal defendants to state prepared trial court transcripts for appeal purposes). But see Ortwein v. Schwab, 410
U.S. 656 (1973) (refusing to apply Boddie result to judicial review of administrative denial of welfare
benefits); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (refusing to apply Boddie to voluntary bankruptcy proceeding); Rowell v. Oesterle, 626 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1980) (court equates freedom to bring
child custody proceeding with freedom to have an abortion and holds that government is not required
to subsidize either). Voting is another area in which the Court has recognized that refusing to subsidize an activity is equivalent for indigents to outlawing it. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 663 (1966) (invalidating poll taxes). The Maher Court distinguished these cases on the ground
that the involved activities not only were protected by the Constitution, but also were controlled and
monopolized by the government. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469-70 n.5, 471 n.6 (1977).
An interesting consequence of this is that women in prisons may still have a right to subsidized
abortions despite Maher. This is because of the monopoly position the government occupies as the
only provider of medical care to prisoners. Note, Inmate Abortions-The Right to Government Funding Behind the PrisonGates, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 550, 558 (1980).

Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine
indicate a growing unwillingness on the part of the Court to protect the
140
rights guaranteed by Roe v. Wade.
Critics of the Court's use of equal protection analysis in Maher and
Harriscan also point to the difficulties inherent in using the equal protection clause to invalidate abortion funding limitations. While several jurists have argued that the equal protection clause compels the protection of
abortion funding, 14 1 this position seems difficult to. support. It comes
close to establishing a constitutional right to have the government pay for
exercising all constitututional rights. 14 2 If the government's refusal to
subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right is equivalent to unconstitutionally burdening that right, the conclusion that the government must
always pay for the exercise of such rights by indigents seems inescapable. 143 This problem becomes especially acute when applied to rights
such as the right to interstate travel. 144
*140. See, e.g.; Note, Harris v. McRae: Whatever Happened to the Roe v. Wade Abortion
Right?, 8 PEPPERDINEL. REv. 861, 897 (1981); Note, Abortion Fundingand the Demise of the Maternal Health Consideration-Harrisv. McRae, 15 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 285, 304 (1981); Note, Harris
v. McRae, 54 TEMP. L.Q. 109, 131-44 (1981) .
141. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 332-37 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 341-46
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287,450 A.2d 925, 928 (1982);Myers,
29 Cal. 3d at 287-88, 625 P.2d at 800-01, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 887-88 (Bird, C.J., concurring).
142. Although this proposition may not seem so unworkable in the context of abortion, it becomes clearly unworkable when such rights as the right to travel and free speech and press rights are
considered. An example of the latter is Presbyterian Hosp. v. Harris, 638 F.2d 1381 (5th Cir. 1981).
In that case, a hospital claimed that Medicare was required to fund television and telephone privileges
for covered patients because the patients had a first amendment'right to uge these instruments. The
court held that even if the patients did have a constitutional right to watch television and use the
telephone, "the government is not required to finance the exercise of First Amendment-rights." Id. at
1385. Of course, the fact that the government might not only refuse to fund constitutionally protected
activity, but might agree to fund alternative activities makes the issue more difficult. But this factor
should not be constitutionally relevant since the government normally has the right to subsidize or not
subsidize any activity it wants in the context of a social welfare program. See supra note 130.
143. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 318 ("To translate the limitation on governmental power
implicit in the Due Process Clause into an affirmative funding obligation would require Congress to
subsidize the medically necessary abortion of an indigent woman even if Congress had not enacted a
Medicaid program to subsidize other medically necessary services.").
The Supreme Court, for good reason, has expressly refused to reach this conclusion: "[A] refusal
to fund protected activity, without more, cannot be equated with the imposition of a 'penalty' on that
activity." Id. at 317 n.19.
It is doubtful, as the Court has indicated, that it would be practical or desirable for a court to
require governments to fund the exercise of constitutional rights by indigents. In San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), Justice Powell, writing for the majority, ended his
opinion with a long postscript in which he admitted that the problems there facing the Court (inequitable funding between rich and poor school districts) were desperately in need of solution. Id. at
56-58. However, he determined that "the ultimate solutions must come from the lawmakers and
from the democratic pressures of those who elect them." Id. at 59. See also Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1970) (applying same analysis to state administration of public welfare program).
The plurality opinion in Myers indicates that Justice Tobriner was also attempting to avoid creating
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Even considering the weaknesses equal protection analysis creates
when applied to the abortion funding problem, it remains a better approach than the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. The difficulties
with equal protection analysis in this context are caused not so much by
any logical inconsistencies in its approach, but by the difficult policy
choices that must be made to solve the problem in a fair and consistent
manner. Even though the Court in Maher v. Roe and Harris v. McRae
reached an unpopular result,145 it at least faced the problem of the extent
to which the government can discourage the exercise of constitutional
rights by selective subsidies and took a discernible and defensible position. 146
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions allowed the Myers court to
avoid some of the problems the Supreme Court faced in Maher and Harris. But in doing so, it substituted for the clear policy choice reached in
the federal cases a logically unsupportable method that allowed the California court to bypass the real issue posed by this controversy. 147 Neither
legal scholarship nor sound policy is served when a court uses the wrong
method to reach what many say is the right result.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions does not hold the promise
some believed it did after Maher and Harris. Close examination reveals
that it is not a sound principle of constitutional analysis, at least in its
application to the abortion funding problem. The weaknesses inherent in
the plurality opinion in Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers demonstrate the weaknesses of the doctrine itself. The doctrine is no
longer needed to serve its historical role as a means for bypassing the
right-privilege distinction. 148 Moreover, the danger exists that it will be
misapplied to cases like Myers where it is not logically supportable. 149
Therefore, it is not a viable alternative to equal protection analysis in
abortion funding cases.
a general right to have the government fund the exercise of constitutional rights. See supra note 95.
Nonetheless, some commentators have argued that there is a general basis in the equal protection
clause for requiring public welfare benefits in certain instances. See Michelman, Foreward:On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV 7 (1969). But see Winter,
Poverty. Economic Equalit , and the Equal Protection Clause, 1972 Sup. CT REv. 4 (sharply criticiz-

ing this position).
144.
145.

See supra note 142.
See supra note 136.

146.

See supra part IIIA1.

147.
148.
149.

See supra part 111A1.
See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
See supra part IIIA2.
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Because the problems associated with applying equal protection analysis to abortion funding cases are on balance less severe than those caused
by applying the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, the former is the
proper analytical tool and should have been applied by the Myers court.
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions should be returned to its place
as one of the many historically interesting but now useless doctrines in
constitutional adjudication.
DavidM. Schoeggl

